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This paper presents the main reasons why public-private partnerships (PPPs) are 
adopted as well as the possible disadvantages for the public and private sectors. By 
means of two case studies on bridge construction and railway infrastructure (Fertagus 
and Lusoponte), we elucidate how a PPP is structured and financed. Furthermore, the 
two case studies illustrate how the renegotiation processes are conducted when the 
public-private contracts have to be altered and what determines (un)successful 
renegotiations.   
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Anatomy of Public–Private Partnerships:  




In public-private partnerships (PPPs), the private sector plays a role in developing and 
maintaining public infrastructure and services, which is usually a public sector 
responsibility. PPPs are a recent phenomenon and were first experimented with 
approximately 20 years ago. As the design, construction, operation, financing, 
ownership and risk transfer of PPPs are country-specific, it is difficult to establish a 
clear definition of PPPs (Duffield, 2010).
3
 In some European countries, such as the 
UK, Portugal, Greece, Hungary, Cyprus, Spain, Ireland (EIB, 2009)), but also in the 
US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, private sector participation in 
infrastructure and public services through the use of PPPs has become increasingly 
popular (Hodge & Greve, 2009).  
This paper offers a systematic and integrated approach to the main concepts, 
definitions, models, characteristics, structure and financing of PPPs. We analyse why 
basic infrastructure and public services must be guaranteed by governments and how 
the private sector has been instrumental in establishing such infrastructure and 
services. Furthermore, we also concentrate on how PPP renegotiations are conducted. 
To detail typical PPP structures and financing models, we use two case studies on 
completely different projects: Fertagus and Lusoponte. We answer the following 
questions: (1) How are PPPs established? (2) How does the private sector structure 
and finance a PPP relative to a private set-up following a traditional procurement? (3) 
Why and how are PPPs renegotiated? 
This paper contributes to the literature by addressing both the advantages and 
disadvantages of PPPs. For example, the main advantage of a PPP—the fact that PPPs 
are ‘off-balance sheet’—comes with several disadvantages: the budget ‘temptation’ 
and future liabilities. We show that the structure, financing, and life cycle of a PPP are 
significantly different from those of a traditional, privately owned project. For 
                                                          
3
 For various definitions, see, e.g., Treasury, 1998; Linder, 1999; Savas, 2000; Klijn, 2000; Kirk & 
Wall, 2001; CCPPP, 2001; EC, 2003; Hardcastle, 2003; Bovaird, 2004; Corner, 2006; OECD, 2008 
Hodge & Greve, 2009. 
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example, there are differences in portfolio management, asset ownership, project 
duration, amount of debt and risk, dividend policy, and shareholder structure. 
Although most renegotiation studies focus on the determinants that lead, in macro 
terms, to successful renegotiations, there is a lack of research on the negotiation 
process, which can be induced by financial distress, increased bankruptcy risks, and a 
changing political agenda.  
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the fundamental concepts of 
PPP. Section 3 lays out the structure and financing of PPPs. Section 4 reviews 
renegotiation theory. Section 5 presents the two case studies and the data used, and 
Section 6 discusses the renegotiation dynamics of Lusoponte and Fertagus. 
Conclusions are provided in Section 7. 
 
2. Main concepts of PPPs  
Traditionally, the public sector is responsible for providing specific services such as 
defence, security, justice, education, health and culture, and for building basic 
infrastructure such as roads or prisons (Savas, 2000). The reasons why these types of 
services or infrastructure are not provided by the private sector are described in 
economic literature as ‘market failures’ (Chong, Huet, Saussier, & Steiner, 2006b; 
Stiglitz, 1989). The private sector is not eager to deliver these types of goods and 
services because they are not profitable. However, for social or political reasons, they 
must be made available to society. Therefore, it becomes the public sector’s 
responsibility to ensure universal access to these goods and services. Another reason 
for the public sector’s provision of the above mentioned services and infrastructure is 
that they may be ‘natural’ monopolies, requiring some source of public intervention 
(Grimsey & Lewis, 2002b). In additional, some of these services or types of 
infrastructure generate positive externalities (the classic example is the construction of 
a new road that reduces travel time and accidents). Another example is the provision 
of health services that will lead to a healthier population, with a positive impact on 
reducing absenteeism and augmenting productivity and economic growth (Sachs, 
2005). Infrastructure comprises various types of fixed investments that are 
characterised by a long duration in construction and operation, as well as 
indivisibility, capital intensity, and a complex valuation process (Grimsey & Lewis, 
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2002a). This type of infrastructure usually requires a high initial investment, and it is 
only financially viable over the long run, which may extend beyond the scope of the 
private sector (Delmon, 2009). Although the public sector is responsible for 
guaranteeing specific services and infrastructure, its role has changed in recent 
decades; the public sector remains the guarantor but is in some cases no longer the 
provider. In fact, the private sector plays an increasingly important role in providing in 
some countries’ services and infrastructure that have traditionally been the public 
sector’s responsibility (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004). 
 
2.1. PPP definitions and different models 
To mark the boundaries of a PPP’s role and scope, let us first discuss the various 
stages of the project: (1) conception, (2) design, (3) construction, (4) financing, (5) 
operations and maintenance (O&M), and (6) residual value or transfer of the 
infrastructure from the private sector to government at the end of the contract. In 
traditional procurement, the government is responsible for all of these stages. When 
construction is contracted to a private firm, the final responsibility lies with the public 
sector, which stands in contrast to privatizations where the asset or service is 
completely transferred to the private partner along with all risks and rewards (Savas, 
2000; Demirag & Khadaroo, 2008).  
The difference between PPPs and traditional procurement or privatisation is that the 
responsibilities over the several stages of a PPP project are divided between the public 
and private sectors. De facto, in a PPP, the public sector purchases a service under 
specific terms and conditions (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002b). 
Figure 1 shows the different government procurement models. In traditional 
procurement, the government is responsible for all stages of the process, i.e., for 
project, risk, costs, budget treatment, financing, contract and ownership, whereas in a 
privatisation, the private sector takes on all of these responsibilities. In PPPs, some 
stages of the project are public responsibilities, whereas others are private. 
Consequently, risks are allocated between public and private sectors. For example, 
construction, financing and O&M usually falls under the private sector, whereas 
political risks, administrative licenses and other risks, e.g., unilateral changes, remain 
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with the public sector. Table 1 summarises the public and private responsibilities for 
each model.  
(Insert Figure 1 and Table 1 here) 
 
2.2. Aspects of PPP contracts falling under the responsibility of the public 
sector 
The specific issues faced by PPP regarding the public sector are summarised in Table 
2, and the rest of this section provides a close look at some of these issues.  
In PPPs, the private sector assumes all costs during the investment stage, enabling the 
government to avoid the investment’s impacts on the budget and national debt. Only 
future payments will affect public expenditures. In contrast, capital and operational 
expenditures are public expenses in traditional procurement, which may create a direct 
budget deficit and immediately pile up more public debt. Figure 2 describes the 
financial outflows for the government under these two scenarios.  
When building infrastructure by means of traditional procurement, there is a high level 
of cash outflow during the investment stage and usually low levels of O&M. 
However, major repairs could occasionally be necessary, leading to an increase in 
operating costs. In PPPs, there are no cash outflows during the investment stage, and 
payments are made to the private consortium during the operational stage only. Those 
payments cover the investment, O&M, debt service and corporate taxes and provide 
shareholders a return. The shapes that these payments can take are shown in Figure 2.  
Insert Table 2 and Figure 2 here 
The public budget finances traditional procurement, i.e., by taxes and debt, whereas in 
a PPP, investment is made by means of equity and debt as financing is commonly a 
private sector responsibility. The main differences between project financing and 
traditional corporate financing are discussed below (in section 3.2).  
In traditional procurement, the government and the construction firm set up a 
construction contract for building an infrastructure. In a privatisation, a selling 
contract is negotiated from the public to private sector. However, in PPPs, a 
concession contract is agreed upon between the public and private sector. This 
contractual framework combines construction, financing and operation (Hart, 2003) 
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and is limited in time (usually long term—30 or more years). Although the contract 
does not cover or predict all conditions or future events, the concession contract is 
complex and covers a wide range of issues such as conditions of the design, 
construction, financing, O&M, public and users’ payments, and the residual value or 
the final transfer of the asset to the public sector. In addition, the PPP comprises a 
series of detailed contracts with third parties: a construction contract with the 
construction company, a financing contract with syndicated banks, outsourcing 
contracts for O&M, insurance contracts to cover risks and a shareholder’s agreement 
that defines the long-term relations with the PPP owners. Although the public sector is 
not formally present in these contracts, it is critical to the PPPs’ success, and 
governments should therefore still carefully monitor.  
The ownership of the asset also differs among procurement, privatisation and PPP. As 
a privatisation is de facto a selling contract, the ownership of the asset is completely 
transferred to the private sector. In traditional procurement, in contrast, the assets 
remain in the hands of the public sector. In PPPs, the physical asset also remains 
public, even over the duration of the concession contract, and the PPP private 
company usually recognises the concession contract in the balance sheet as an 
intangible asset during the concession period. Afterwards, the assets revert to the 
public sector, usually with a residual value of zero. 
 
2.3. PPP advantages and disadvantages 
What advantages does the government see in PPPs relative to traditional procurement? 
Why are academic studies sceptical about PPPs as an alternative use of public funds? 
The advantage ascribed to PPPs that is most frequently advanced is the ‘off-balance 
sheet’ accounting of this transaction (Grimsey & Lewis, 2005). PPPs have no impact 
on public expenditure and therefore no impact on the public debt during the 
investment stage; only the future payments from government to the PPP will be 
accounted for in the public budget. This advantage embeds a potential danger, namely 
the temptation to avoid budget constraints, which may lead to a debt overhang. We 
use this term to refer to the condition of an organisation (either government or a 
company) under which the debt level is so high that the organisation is no longer able 
to attract more debt, even if the debt conditions are favourable to new investments 
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(Cordella, Ricci, & Ruiz-Arranz, 2005). Some countries have established many 
projects over a short period of time, raising concerns about their affordability 
(Grimsey & Lewis, 2002a; Froud, 2003). Future payments can threaten the 
sustainability of public finances in some cases, as liabilities may only arise when 
payments are due (Maskin & Tirole, 2008). As such, the impact of PPPs on 
governments’ future budgets is also an issue of concern (Guasch, Laffont, & Straub, 
2007). 
The second advantage of PPPs is the possibility of building an infrastructure that 
otherwise would not be built because of budget restrictions (Debande, 2002; Grout, 
2005). In several countries, PPPs have been instrumental in reducing infrastructure 
gaps. However, as budget constraints are less binding, concerns about rational 
decision making have emerged. The PPP approach may induce governments to be less 
careful in their choice of projects. Heald & Georgiou (2011) show that in some cases, 
assets are chosen with little (or even no) economic or social rationality, which is 
attributed to the fact that governments tend to not separate the investment decision 
from the financial decision.  
Third, PPPs aim at generating Value for Money (VfM), the idea being that the same 
quantity and quality of services can be provided at a lower overall cost. The goal of 
PPPs is to achieve microeconomic efficiency of public money in terms of a better use 
of those resources because of better management (OECD, 2008). However, VfM is 
complex to measure and has led to an intensive debate on whether PPPs really do 
generate VfM (Broadbent, Gill, & Laughlin, 2008; Grimsey, 2007). A pitfall in VfM 
valuation is that the concept is mainly based on risk transfer (Ball, Heafey, & King, 
2007). Academics provide the following reasons for why PPPs do not deliver 
sufficient VfM: (i) the private sector assumes few risks and thus has few incentives to 
pursue better management and efficiency; (ii) risk is an ambiguous and complex 
concept, leading to valuation uncertainty; (iii) the methods used to valuate risks are 
considered incomplete, as the public sector usually adopts simple valuation tools, 
often based on a qualitative approach; (iv) the public sector comparator favours PPPs 
because of an ‘optimism bias’ or the use of excessively low discount rates; and (v) 
PPPs often only show VfM after a risk transfer. 
Fourth, the private sector assumes some of the risks of a PPP project, which is 
considered yet another advantage compared to traditional procurement. Nevertheless, 
7 
 
Ng and Loosemore (2007) and Broadbent et al. (2008) note that the valuation of risk 
transfers is not straightforward and hinges on some subjectivity (Shaoul, 2005; Ball et 
al., 2007). Pollitt (2002) and Klijn (2003) argue that this situation is aggravated by the 
public sector’s lack of experience.  
Fifth, the public sector can focus more on strategy and less on operational tasks when 
it initiates a PPP (Bovaird, 2004). Still, PPP contracts are long-term (usually more 
than 20 years), and government policies are not necessarily consistent over time 
following changes in government, making strategic planning even more difficult and 
unpredictable (Heald, 2003).  
Sixth, a PPP represents simplicity as it leads to just one contract between the public 
and one private company, whereas traditional procurement brings about a multitude of 
contracts. Nevertheless, despite the PPP contract’s complexity, it is unavoidably still 
incomplete (Blanc-Brude, Goldsmith, & Valila, 2006), which can and frequently does 
lead to future renegotiations (Guasch et al., 2007). Furthermore, a single contract also 
induces asymmetric information because it allows the private sector to have more 
information than the public sector; in addition, there is no competitive environment 
once the contract is signed. This situation could lead to ‘opportunistic behaviour’ on 
the part of the private sector (Guasch, 2003; Chong et al., 2006b;Parker & Hartley, 
2003), which occurs when a contracting party strategically uses the contract’s 
imperfections to obtain a higher proportion of the value generated by the contract at 
the expense of its contracting partner (Chong, Huet, & Saussier, 2006a). For instance, 
Ho & Liu (2004) claim that in cases in which the private sector can easily obtain a 
renegotiation, the private sector would be able to opportunistically behave with 
respect to contract obligations. These conditions may result in the public sector 
choosing an inferior option (adverse selection) or moral hazard from the private sector 
(accept a lower price at the bidding stage, with the goal to later, without competition, 
renegotiate, leading to extra costs to users and/or taxpayers). The advantages and 
disadvantages are summarised in Table 3. 
Insert Table 3 here 
 




3.1. PPP structure 
For each PPP project, a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) is created. The SPV represents 
a legal individual company that, however, only operates and owns one specific 
project/concession during the contract period. It is this company that will sign the PPP 
contract with the government. This company will be responsible for all stages of the 
project when they fall under the private sector (for instance, this comprises the phases 
of the design, construction, financing, operation and maintenance). The reason why an 
SPV is created is that a project finance scheme is used (see the next subsection) 
(Yescombe, 2011). Thus, several relevant issues are addressed: (i) the lenders can 
evaluate the (fluctuations of the) cash flows that cannot be diverted to other 
businesses. This evaluation increases the lenders’ confidence that the project will be 
able to repay debts. (ii) There is no recourse to the shareholders, protecting them with 
limited liability and non-resource (sometimes limited) financing. (iii) The project will 
not be affected by problems caused by other business operations, which could occur if 
an existing company were used to develop the project rather than an SPV.  
SPV funding is derived from shareholders, banks and bond markets. Financial 
advisers, lawyers and other types of consultants are involved in the SPV, especially in 
the planning stage and at the public bidding (Nevitt & Fabozzi, 2000). During the 
construction stage, the construction sub-contractors are responsible for building the 
infrastructure. In this manner, the SPV passes the construction risks on to third parties. 
At the operational stage, important relationships with outsourcing and insurance 
companies are established. Again, the SPV’s goal is to pass the operational and 
maintenance risks to third parties.  
Using Lusoponte as an example, we present a typical SPV structure (Figure 3). 
Lusoponte’s SPV has attracted debt from banks and equity from sponsors. The 
construction of the new bridge was contracted to another company, Novaponte, which 
is owned by the same shareholders of Lusoponte. Operating and maintenance (O&M) 
was also contracted to another company, Gestiponte, owned by the same shareholders. 
Thus, construction and O&M risks were transferred to third parties. These risks will 
no longer affect Lusoponte’s future cash flows, reducing the lenders’ uncertainty 
about the SPV’s ability to repay the debt.  
Insert Figure 3 here 
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The PPP framework is described in Figure 4. Although the public sector is often 
described as a single entity, there are in fact several independent parties, such as the 
government that issues the contract, the national audit office (NAO) that controls the 
use of public money, and a PPP-dedicated unit (e.g., at the ministerial level) that 
monitors the concession. 
The public stakeholder is the government that signs the concession contract with the 
private sector. As PPPs are usually created in regulated and low-competition markets 
(such as transport, health or education), the regulatory agencies of that specific sector 
usually play an important role, which is especially true during the operational stage, 
when the task of the public sector is to monitor the private sector. This monitoring 
requirement does not only arise from the contract, as regulated markets necessitate 
supervision, regardless of the contractual responsibilities of the public and private 
sectors.  
Because PPPs involve public money, other important entities in the public sector will 
be involved at a later stage, including organisations such as the NAO
4
, or as it is called 
in some countries, the Court of Audits. An NAO is an independent body that 
scrutinises government actions and decisions. Although it is part of the public sector, 
the NAO is independent of the executive power. They also tend to sanction poor 
decisions or at least provide recommendations for the better use of public money. 
Another important public entity present in most countries is a PPP-dedicated unit. This 
unit is defined as ‘any organisation set up with full or partial aid of the government to 
ensure that the necessary capacity to create, support, and evaluate multiple PPP 
agreements exists’ (OECD, 2010, pg. 11). Therefore, a PPP unit is a government 
department that oversees the complete life cycle of the PPP (Farrugia, 2008). Both of 
these studies emphasise the importance of PPP-dedicated units for the ultimate success 
of PPPs.  
Insert Figure 4 here 
 
3.2. PPP finance 
                                                          
4
 National Audit Office 
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PPPs are financed by the private sector using a scheme called project finance. This 
refers to ‘a non-resource or limited resource financing structure in which debt, equity, 
and credit are enhanced for the construction and operation of a particular facility in a 
capital-intensive industry’ (Fight, 2005). Typically, PPPs (especially with respect to 
infrastructures such as highways) require high capital investment and low O&M costs. 
Revenues mainly serve to cover depreciation and debt service and, to a lesser degree, 
to yield shareholder return. The high capital investment phase (during the construction 
phase, normally the first 4–5 years of the contract) is mainly financed through debt. 
Esty (2004) reports project finance to have debt levels of 70%–90%, with equity 
covering the remaining part. For the United Kingdom, the debt levels amount to 80%–
90% (Spackman, 2002), whereas for the Portuguese highway sector, the reported debt 
amounts to a similar percentage of investment (Sarmento, 2010). Debt is often called 
‘non-resource debt’, which indicates that lenders rely solely on future cash flows for 
debt service (repayment of principal plus interest). 
PPP debt consists of senior and mezzanine (also called junior or subordinated) debt. 
During a construction stage of 4 or 5 years, milestone payments are to be made to the 
construction company (Yescombe, 2002), indicating that the same level of financing is 
not necessary at any moment in time; project finance follows a drawdown in financing 
(Figure 5). The SPV first uses the mezzanine debt as a resource, followed by equity. 
and finally senior debt. In the operational stage, the reimbursement of debt and equity 
follows a different path (Figure 6). The SPV first pays back the senior debt (which has 
a priority right on the cash flows), then mezzanine debt and only subsequently the 
shareholders’ equity. Usually, the debt maturity is shorter than the project duration 
(Gatti, 2012).  
Insert Figure 5 and Figure 6 here 
In Table 4, we compare project finance to the typical financing of corporations 
(corporate finance). The main difference lies in the nature of the company. In project 
finance, the company is an SPV, which means that the company only operates one 
particular project such that one could state that the company is in fact the project.  
In project finance, debt represents at least 70% of the investment, often more. This 
figure is three times greater than in traditional corporate finance (Esty, 2004). In a 
company, the shareholders ultimately own the assets, and debt is usually guaranteed 
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by those assets, or at least in part. In project finance, debt is only guaranteed by the 
future project’s cash, and the SPV does not own the asset, but only a concession 
contract for a long but limited period. 
Business risk and, consequently, interest and discount rates can significantly vary 
across firms. Nevertheless, before the recent financial crises, this variation was very 
low in project finance as the interest rates used for discounting were not significantly 
above the risk-free rate, which reflected the low level of project risk. 
A disadvantage of project finance is that transaction costs are higher than those in 
traditional corporate financing because the concession contracts are complex and 
incomplete (Esty, 2004). However, the long-term high level of investment in project 
finance enables more efficient financing. By transferring risks to other parties (who 
can manage them better), project finance promotes more efficient and transparent risk 
sharing and risk management. Ultimately, high leverage with a low risk premium 
allows for a reduced weighted average cost of capital.  
Insert Table 4 here 
 
4. Renegotiations  
Many PPP contracts are renegotiated at one point in time. Renegotiations (also known 
as financial rebalancing or financial rescue agreements (FRAs)) are usually triggered 
by a specific event and affect the financial conditions of the concession (Yescombe, 
2011). Renegotiations usually result from unpredicted or uncontrolled events, 
although some conditions triggering renegotiation are listed in the contract. It should 
be noted that adjusting tariffs for inflation is not considered a renegotiation. Only 
when substantial departures from the original contract occur and the contract is 
amended shall we label such a change as a renegotiation. 
There are several reasons why renegotiations frequently occur in PPPs; the long-term 
and complex nature of such contracts and the political context make it impossible to 
foresee all future states of the world (Engel, Fischer, & Galetovic, 2009). There are 
three main events that trigger renegotiations: (i) bankruptcy of the SPV, obliging the 
public sector to rescue the project; (ii) failure due to incorrect contractual assumptions 
that affect the private partner’s profitability; or (iii) a unilateral change by government 
that results in changes that affect the concession. Usually, a tariff increase or financial 
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compensation from the government to restore the profitability of the PPP is the 
outcome of the renegotiations. 
Renegotiations initiated by governments are usually related to political decisions that 
affect the concession contract or the financial conditions. These political decisions can 
affect several stages of the concession. At the design and build phase, governments 
can make changes in the project (reducing or increasing investments and additional 
works), change environmental requirements or create new administrative delays. 
Other changes can occur at the operational stage, such as specific legal changes or 
contract changes, regarding issues such as tariffs, service requirements or payments.   
Most PPP renegotiation studies relate to the South American transport, water and 
sanitation sectors.
5
 These studies document that the existence of a regulator, better 
quality of the institutional framework, GDP growth, and a low level of corruption 
reduce the probability of a renegotiation. In contrast, price caps on tariffs, a need for 
follow-up investments and new elections increase the odds that the concession 
contract will be altered.
6
  
In sum, PPP renegotiations can be an opportunity to adjust and address new conditions 
and terms of a project and thus increase the projects value, on either the public or the 
private side.  
To illustrate how renegotiations work in practice, we will analyse two case studies, but 
we turn first to the methodology employed. Given that academic finance research on 
PPPs is still in its early days, the two case studies will demonstrate the specific 
characteristics and idiosyncrasies of PPPs in relation to the complex process of 
contract renegotiation. 
In the next subsection, we will answer the following questions: Why and how did 
Fertagus and Lusoponte renegotiate, and what were the negotiations’ outcomes? 
 
4.1 Two PPPs: Fertagus and Lusoponte 
Let us commence by introducing the two firms.  
Fertagus 
                                                          
5
 (Guasch, 2003); (Guasch, 2004); (Guasch & Laffont, 2005); (Guasch, 2006); (Guasch & Straub, 
2006); (Guasch et al., 2007); (Guasch, Laffont, & Straub, 2008) and (Guasch & Straub, 2009) 
6
 (Engel et al., 2009), (de Brux, 2010) and (De Brux, Beuve, & Saussier, 2011)  
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In 1997, the government decided to open a railway concession for the bridge named 
‘Ponte 25 de Abril’ (the 25
th
 of April Bridge) to improve the connection between the 
northern and southern parts of Lisbon. The concession contract with the private sector 
included investment in the transport material (rolling stock) and the railway service 
(operations and maintenance). The railway infrastructure was already available (when 
the bridge was built in the 1960s, it was prepared to have trains in the lower deck). 
The decision was to leave the infrastructure a public sector responsibility and allocate 
only the operations to a private company. In 1999, a contract was signed with Fertagus 
(one of the three bidders), a company owned by the Barraqueiro group, a private 
sector transport group already operating in the Lisbon metropolitan area but mainly in 
bus services.  
The contract conditions stipulated an investment of €114 M, which was to be made 
only with private sector funding through a bank loan of €89 M and equity of €25 M 
(or 22% of the total investment). The concession had a 30-year duration, with the 
financial viability dependent on revenues from traffic (i.e., tolls). The contract 
included the traffic conditions (density) under which the private sector was allowed to 
renegotiate. 
Lusoponte 
In the early 1990s, the Lisbon urban area, south of the Tagus, was served by a single 
bridge
7
 to reach the city. This situation presented a major constraint on traffic, not 
only in the city but also between the northern and southern parts of the country. In 
1992, the government decided to open a bidding process for a second bridge. This new 
bridge, called ‘Vasco da Gama’,
8
 connected the eastern part of Lisbon to the southern 
rim in Alcochete. Two consortiums participated in the bidding, and the ‘Lusoponte’ 
consortium won. A design, build, finance, operate and transfer model was set up in 
1993 to build the new bridge (to open in 1998). There was a condition that the O&M 
of the older bridge (the ‘Ponte 25 de Abril’) would become the responsibility of 
Lusoponte starting on 1 January 1996. Lusoponte set up a typical PPP structure with a 
                                                          
7
 It was originally (in 1968) called the ‘Ponte Salazar,’ and after the 1974 revolution, renamed ‘Ponte 
25 de Abril’. 
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The initial concession was financed by private and European Union funds, along with 
the revenues from the Ponte 25 de Abril, but without public funds. The total 
investment, €987 M, consisted of construction costs (€645 M) and other costs, 
including maintenance costs, payments to expropriate land and environmental costs. A 
significant amount of private debt was derived from the European Investment Bank 
(EIB). In 1993, before the introduction of the euro, Portugal was only able to borrow 
for the medium term (usually for only 3 to 5 years). A 20-year loan was only possible 
by borrowing from the EIB. Hence, most of the debt was derived from EIB and not 
from commercial banks. Ultimately, funding came from EU funds (€319 M - 32%); 
‘25 Abril’ revenues (€50 M - 5%); EIB loans (€299 M - 30%); bank loans (€120 M - 
12%) and equity (€199 M - 20%), a total investment of €987 M. 
The concession period was to end as soon as 2.25 billion vehicles had crossed both 
sides of the river (which was expected to occur between 2019 and 2022) or on March 
of 2028, whichever came first. To allow the project to be financially sustainable 
without public direct investment, three conditions were agreed upon at the time of 
contract: 1) The toll prices on the existing bridge (‘25 de Abril’) would increase at the 
beginning of 1994 to reach the ‘Vasco da Gama bridge’ toll prices by 1998; 2) After 
1994, the existing exemption on toll payments during August for the ‘25 de Abril’ 
bridge should end; 3) Until the end of the contract, if the government should decide to 
construct new bridges on the river, concession would have to be granted to Lusoponte. 
Thus, the absence of future competition was an important incentive to attract private 
funds for this project. 
The fact that the first two assumptions were determined to be unrealistic at a later 
stage triggered renegotiations. 
For each of the above mentioned PPPs, an SPV was created with long concession 
periods (20 years for Fertagus and 30 years for Lusoponte). Fertagus had a high level 
                                                          
9
 Initial shareholder structure: Kvaerner Group (24.8%); Campenon Bernanrd SGE (22.0%); Bento 
Pedroso Construções (14.8%); Mota e Companhia (13.8%); Somague (13.8%); Teixeira Duarte (7.5%); 
H. Hagen (2.8%); Edifer (0.4%).  
Actual structure: Macquarie Infrastructure (UK) Limited (31%); Vinci Construction Grands Projects 
(31%); Mota/Engil, S.A. (14%); Somague Itinere - Concessões de Infraestruturas, S.A. (17%); Teixeira 
Duarte - Engenharia e Construções, S.A. (8%) 
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of leverage (78%), whereas Lusoponte did not (42%, which is unusually low in project 
finance). The reason for the low debt level is that European Union grants (subsidies) 
represented 32% of the investment. The debts in both companies were ‘non-resource’ 
and included both senior and mezzanine debt.  
 
4.2 The process dynamics of the Fertagus and Lusoponte renegotiations  
 Fertagus  
The Fertagus contract comprised a band traffic system with three bands (an upper, a 
reference and a lower band) to share traffic risk between the government and the 
private company. The concession contract defined conditions in terms of the real 
traffic that was expected to use the railway during the operation period (see Table 5). 
If traffic estimations were understated and real traffic exceeded the upper band, 
Fertagus would face a reduction in tariffs and would be responsible for improving 
service. If traffic projections were too optimistic, with real traffic falling below the 
lower band, Fertagus could demand a financial rescue. The following was the 
government’s guarantee to the private sector: the ability to address the possibility of 
overoptimistic government traffic projections, which would trigger a renegotiation. 
Fertagus could then ask for an increase in the concession period, tariffs and/or 
financial compensation. 
Insert Table 5 and Figure 7 here 
 
Over the period 1999–2003, the actual traffic was substantially below the lower band 
by 40%–60% in every year (Figure 7). This allowed Fertagus to ask for a 
renegotiation that resulted in several changes to the concession, leading to a better and 
more balanced agreement between the parties. These conditions and changes were as 
follows: the financial compensation paid by the government to Fertagus was €24 M in 
2004, €21 M in 2005, plus a total of €65 M split over the period 2005 to 2010)
10
. The 
net payment for this period was approximately € 80 M. Although the private sector 
                                                          
10
 The claw-back system allowed the public sector to receive 75% of revenues if the real traffic level 
rose to the estimated traffic level, which eventually did happen. The government received a total of €12 
M from Fertagus, which was caused by a claw-back agreement. New traffic projections were made, and 
the band system was abandoned. Additionally, Fertagus paid (between 2005 and 2010) a total of € 18 M 
for infrastructure usage.  
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received a financial compensation, the concession period was reduced to 10 years (but 
the possibility of a 9-year extension was created). This extension would only apply if 
the concession became financially viable without public support, which indeed 
occurred in 2010. Fertagus is currently operating without any public financial support 
(until 2019 when the concession ends). The reasons for reducing the concession period 
were primarily to limit the private sector’s gains but also to ensure, if the SPV were to 
incur further losses, that the public sector would recover the project sooner, not having 
to face a new renegotiation process. A second change to Fertagus’ contract was that 
the traffic risk, which was originally shared, became Fertagus sole responsibility. 
Third, the financial conditions were also altered: despite the higher project risk (due to 
the assumption of traffic risk), the profitability was decreased (the internal rate of 
return [IRR] dropped from 10.9% to 7.8%). Fertagus passed on the senior debt to the 
public sector, along with ownership of the assets, but remained responsible for the 
debt service. Fourth, a claw-back mechanism was introduced, regulating the sharing of 
unexpected revenues between the government and the private sector. Fifth, the service 
conditions were also revised; users had to pay a higher tariff for services, and the 
number of trains was reduced. 
In the end, the public sector spent almost €80 M (in current 2014 prices) between 
2004 and 2010, but the concession could remain open and is now financially 
independent from public money. After 2010, as foreseen in the 2004 renegotiation, the 
concession period was extended to 2019, with no further public compensation. In fact, 
from 2010 onwards, the public sector continues to receive the revenues above the 
case-base forecast. Moreover, from 2017-2019, the public sector will be entitled to 
50% of those years’ net income
11
.  




Initially, the Lusoponte concession was completely financed by the private sector, EU 
funds and the Ponte 25 de Abril bridge revenues. This financial scheme depended on 
the three conditions previously mentioned. The contract established that if any of these 
three conditions was not met, Lusoponte could demand a renegotiation of the contract 
and financial compensation from the government. Additional clauses that could trigger 
                                                          
11
 Fertagus forecasted to deliver to the government €1 M in 2017, €1.2 M in 2018 and €1.4 M in 2019. 
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renegotiations included ‘exceptional events’ in the currency market (unfavourable 
movement of the Escudo/Deutsche Mark exchange rate—prior to the introduction of 
the euro) and specific legislative changes with a direct impact on the concession. 
Risks to the public sector representing possible financial compensation to the PPP 
were limited to unilateral changes to contract, force majeure, specific legal changes 
and delays in EU grant payments or delays in land expropriations. The compensation 
could be made by using each of the following three mechanisms (or a combination 
thereof): (1) increase in the concession period, (2) increasing tolls or (3) direct 
financial compensation. If any of these events were to occur, the project could be 
renegotiated. Public financial compensation would have to assure minimum project 
financial stability. In the contract, financially stability was determined by a ‘ratio of 
debt coverage’
12
 of 1.13 in 1998, 1.19 in 1999 and 1.25 beyond. In addition, the 
project minimum IRR (pre-tax) was established to be 11.43%. 
In 1994, the government increased the Ponte 25 de Abril tolls, which led to a major 
political crisis involving street riots and a bridge blockade. To avoid future conflicts, 
the government decided not to increase the toll, maintain the August exemption and 
start a discount policy for frequent users. These changes were valid for one year and 
had to be renewed each year (over the period 1995–2000). As previously mentioned, 
the private sector investment was initially to be paid by tolls from both bridges. The 
fact that the ‘25 de abril’ bridge toll prices did not increase reduced the expected 
revenues, unbalancing the financial base case. This loss of revenue led the company to 
request a renegotiation, which led to the first of five financial rebalance agreements 
(FRAs) (see Table 6).  
Insert Table 6 here 
In 2001, a global agreement (referred to as FRA 6) was reached to end the succession 
of FRAs. The agreement had three main objectives: (i) create a price policy that 
differentiates the toll prices on both bridges by keeping the price on the Ponte 25 de 
Abril bridge lower than that on the Vasco da Gama bridge, (ii) adapt the initial 
financial model to the new toll conditions, and (iii) end all of the remaining 
                                                          
12
 The level of debt that can be raised for a project is based primarily on the projected ability to pay 
interest and repay loan principal instalments, with a comfortable margin of safety. To assess this margin 
of safety, lenders calculate cover ratios, namely the DSCR (Yescombe, 2011). The DSCR represents 
the ability of a project to ensure debt service. The DSCR is equal to the interest payments plus debt 
amortisation as a percentage of free cash flow. To reduce credit risk, senior lenders require a minimum 
DSCR in each project. 
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renegotiation requests and conflicts and adapt the concession to the new financial 
conditions of the Eurozone. These new conditions allowed for a refinancing of the 
concession and substantially lowered the cost of debt. Portugal´s entrance to the 
Eurozone, along with the borrowing conditions in the financial markets during that 
period, significantly reduced the country’s interest rate, making credit abundant and 
cheap. The private sector fully benefited from these new financial conditions of 
Lusoponte. 
The global agreement compensated the private partner in different ways: there was (i) 
a direct financial compensation (a total of €306 M, divided between 2001 to 2019); (ii) 
an increase in the concession period, until 2030. Considering that in the initial contract 
the concession period was determined to last until 2.25 billion vehicles had crossed 
both sides of the river (which was expected to occur between 2019 and 2022), the 
concession period has increased 7 to 11 years beyond the initial projections. (iii) A 
change in the risk allocation matrix (reducing the risk to the private partner). (iv) The 
end of Lusoponte’s responsibility for the Ponte 25 de Abril bridge’s O&M (reducing 
the overall cost to the private sector). (v) The continuation of the concession at an 
11.43% IRR pre-tax. (vi) If the corporate tax rate were to increase by more than 1 p.p., 
the government would have to compensate the company (see Table 7). In spite of 
these benefits given to Lusoponte, there was no claw-back clause that would allow the 
public sector to share future additional (unexpected) benefits. 
Insert Table 7 here 
 
The global agreement (FRA 6) has led to changes in the original risk allocation 
matrix. Three types of risks have changed: (i) Generic legislative changes (e.g., an 
increase in the tax rate would not affect this company as the government would 
provide financial compensation for an additional tax burden). (ii) The operational risk 
of the Ponte 25 de Abril bridge, which was originally the private sector’s 
responsibility, became a public responsibility, as the operational costs were paid by 
the Ministry of Transport. (iii) The financing and demand risks, which were allocated 
to the private sector in the original contract, are now shared between the two parties. 
Overall, the private sector risk level was decreased, but despite the reduction in the 
risk level of the project, there was no reduction in the PPP profitability (which is very 
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different from that in the Fertagus case). In fact, now with less risk, Lusoponte has 
continued to have the same pre-tax IRR as in the initial agreement. 
In 2007, Lusoponte asked for an FRA 7, following changes in corporate tax rates, a 
reclassification of vehicles in terms of toll payments, the introduction of tolls in the 
month of August and additional maintenance work necessary on the Ponte 25 de Abril 
bridge. As a consequence, the government directly paid Lusoponte €22 million.  
These series of renegotiations over the past 15 years have significantly altered the 
concession characteristics. As we have described, there were changes in the risk 
allocation matrix, reducing the project risk. In addition, the debt conditions have 
improved, lowering the cost of debt to Lusoponte. However, the main change is that 
the project no longer solely relies on private funds. The several renegotiations resulted 
in a variety of types of public funding: direct financial compensation, an increase in 
the concession period and a reduction in the concession maintenance costs. How did 
this public funding change the overall funding of this investment? At the end of these 
renegotiations, the funding of the project had changed substantially. From an initial 
project without public funds (except EU subsidies), the project became mainly 
financed through public resources. Focusing on the initial funding (the €987 M of 
investment mentioned previously), we learn that the public sector financial support 
resulting from the renegotiations amount to half of this value.  
 
 4.3 Main findings from the case studies 
Up to this point, we have discussed how Fertagus and Lusoponte renegotiate. 
However, what can we learn from these two cases? Table 8 summarises the main 
findings. 
First, the events that led to renegotiations were substantially different in each case: In 
Fertagus, it was the fact that demand was below the case-base estimation. In 
Lusoponte, it was a political decision to change the contract conditions, regarding toll 
prices. This led to a fundamental difference: In Fertagus, renegotiation was initiated 
by the private company that was facing imminent bankruptcy, giving stronger 
bargaining power to government. In Lusoponte, renegotiations resulted from the 
government’s decision not to increase tariffs. This unilateral change in the contract 
gave the private company a strong asymmetric position in the negotiations. 
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Insert Table 8 here 
This difference was aggravated by three other factors: (i) the fact that Fertagus 
belongs to a group whose sole business is to operate several public transportation 
firms in the Lisbon region may have an impact on the private-side negotiation 
position. There may have been a reputational cost to the private group in the collapse 
of the project or in the PPP being perceived by public opinion as inefficient and a 
waste of public money. (ii) In Lusoponte, changes in the public administration 
structure concerning the monitoring and evaluation of this project took place. At the 
beginning of the contract, Lusoponte was supervised by a specific government 
department (GATTEL). With the extinction of this department, the PPP competences 
regarding the project were divided between the Ministries of Finance and Transport. 
According to several Court of Audit reports, and as emphasised in De Lemos (2004), 
this division has created coordination problems, which have been aggravated by 
changes in government and policy. (iii) Another reason why Lusoponte did so well in 
the renegotiations was caused by the fact that the initial contract did not account for 
social and political risks. The two bridges have different users. Those who use the ‘25 
de Abril’ bridge do not frequently use the ‘Vasco da Gama’ bridge. Therefore, the 
former see the increase in toll prices as a tax to pay for a bridge that does not benefit 
them. In addition, the contract also did not provide a preview of the necessary 
mechanisms to allow the public sector to validate the company´s financial demands.  
Thus, although both projects had public financial support, their renegotiations 
outcomes were substantially different: Fertagus’s renegotiation resulted in a more 
sustainable and robust concession that became financially independent as it relied only 
on commercial revenues (after 2010). This renegotiation resulted from two main 
changes in the concession: First, deleveraging of the Fertagus balance-sheet led to 
better financial conditions. Second, the change in the demand risk made it possible for 
Fertagus to be more flexible in commercial issues (especially those related to traffic, 
such as prices, discount policies and timetables) and focus more on operations. The 
public sector also benefited from the renegotiation: mechanisms for sharing upper-side 
revenue enabled the government to reimburse part of the public financial effort 
because demand has been above the new projections for traffic. In addition, the 
reduction in the project risk was followed by a reduction in company profitability. 
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This renegotiation forged a new equilibrium between the private sector’s profit and 
the public sector’s interests.  
In contrast, the Lusoponte renegotiation process was quite the opposite that of 
Fertagus. Several issues significantly changed because of the chain of renegotiations. 
In the initial concession, tolls were supposed to have the same price in both bridges. 
Between 1995 and 2000, toll prices for the ‘25 de Abril’ bridge were frozen; after the 
global agreement, it was decided that a different price system for each bridge would 
be maintained. After the first renegotiation, a discount policy was introduced. In the 
global agreement, Lusoponte was granted a tax benefit to compensate for the increase 
in the corporate tax rate. Moreover, although the project risk was reduced, the 
concession profitability did not decrease. The government also increased direct 
compensation, extended the concession period and reduced maintenance costs. In this 
renegotiation, the public sector gave in to anything requested by Lusoponte (see Table 
6). This situation raises some doubts about whether the public sector was able to 
correctly assess the consequences of the demands from the private sector. These 
concerns were also expressed by the Portuguese Court of Audits. Furthermore, while 
real traffic during these years was above the traffic projections in the base case, whose 
benefits were entirely captured by the private parties, without being accounted for in 
the renegotiations. As a result, a substantial part of the investment (which was 
expected to be financed exclusively trough private funds and EU subsidies) was 
financed through public resources.  
Ultimately, the Fertagus renegotiation shows that when both parties are committed to 
sustain current and future relationships, they are prone to negotiate a better agreement, 
ensuring long-term sustainability and value for both. From 1999 to 2004 (the 
renegotiation year), Fertagus accounted for an accumulated loss of €32 M (a deviation 
of –600%) relative to the initial base case. From 2005 until 2010, the company had a 
total profit after taxes of €56 M (an increase of 42% compared to the renegotiated base 
case). Improved concession conditions, better management and higher demand were 
the main causes of this turnaround.  
In contrast, in Lusoponte, these renegotiations ended up requiring substantial public 
sector financial effort, which led to significant opposition to this project and 
contributed to a generally negative view of PPPs in Portugal. As indicated by De 
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Lemos (2004), a complete risk management analysis requires an assessment based not 
only on technical factors but also on political and social factors.  
 
5. Conclusion. 
We sought the answers to three research questions: (i) What are the main 
characteristics of PPPs? (ii) How does the private sector structure and finance PPPs? 
(iii) Why and how are PPP contracts renegotiated?  
This paper advocates an integrated approach to PPPs, both from the perspective of the 
public and the private sector. Concerning the first question, the main reason why PPPs 
stand between traditional procurement and privatisation is the different role that the 
private sector plays in each stage of a project. However, PPPs also differ in terms of 
contract, ownership, risk, financing, costs and public budget treatment. Regarding this 
last issue, by using a PPP, there are no costs to the public sector during the investment 
stage, but annual payments to the private company arise over the contract period. PPPs 
thus avoid budget constraints during the construction of infrastructure. Governments 
should carefully weigh the advantages and disadvantages of PPPs.  
Regarding the second question, we document that PPPs are very different from 
traditional firms in terms of asset ownership, project duration, amount of debt and risk 
and shareholder structures. The financial engineering of PPPs (based on attracting 
high levels of debt solely based on the project cash flows) generates opportunities for 
more efficient use of capital.   
The two case studies reflect, in response to the third research question, why and how 
both PPPs renegotiate. PPPs have specific characteristics, such as the incomplete 
nature of the contracts, that make them prone to renegotiate. However, renegotiations 
are regarded as a pitfall in PPPs. In fact, the likely outcome of most renegotiations is 
an increase in the costs to users and/or taxpayers. Moreover, in many cases, there is a 
reduction in the quality of service, along with a lack of transparency in most 
processes. All of these factors make renegotiations contribute to a generalised 
negative perception of PPPs and private sector involvement in public services. This 
view reduces the scope of the private sector to improve and reform the public sector, 




PPP projects must be designed to address the issues that can lead to renegotiations and 
to facilitate them in a balanced manner. In many cases, renegotiations are not used to 
improve the conditions of a project. However, renegotiations will be used to that end 
only if both parties are committed to creating a sustainable solution.  
We observed all of these factors in both case studies. The Fertagus renegotiation was a 
success, allowing for a financially viable concession because both parties were 
committed to achieving a more robust concession. This success can be attributed to 
two reasons: the fact that Fertagus belonged to a group already operating in transport 
in the Lisbon area and the fact that renegotiation was requested by the private sector, 
facing eminent bankruptcy. By contrast, the Lusoponte renegotiation was a failure in 
which public funds were used due to political decisions instead of being used to 
improve public services. Regarding renegotiations, we can learn from these two case 
studies that governments should be extremely careful when designing a concession 
and a corresponding contract. Governments must anticipate on the possibility of 
renegotiation events. In addition, control and regulation of the contract during the long 
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Figure 1- Different government procurement models 
 































Figure 2- Public procurement vs. PPP financial outflows in highway construction 
 














Figure 3– Lusoponte’s PPP structure 
 




































Figure 4– A typical PPP structure 
 










































Figure 5– PPP finance during the construction stage 
  
 
Source: own exhibit 
 
Figure 6– PPP finance during the operational stage 
 
Source: own exhibit 
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Table 1 – Different PPP models 
 
This table presents the most common PPP models with the division of the responsibilities over 
the public/private sectors by project stage. 
 
Model Design Build Finance Ownership Operate Transfer 
BTO – Build, Transfer and 
Operate 
Public Private Public Public Private Private 
DBFO – Design Build, Finance 
and Operate 
Private Private Private Public Private Public 
BOOT – Build, Own, Operate 
and Transfer 
Public Private Public Private Private Private 
DBFOM – Design, Build, 
Finance, Operate and Manage 
Private Private Private Public Private Public 
BOO – Build, Own, Operate Public Private Public Private Private Public 















responsible for all 
stages of the 
project. 
Government is responsible for 
planning the output and 
outcomes of the project and 
usually also for payments. The 
other issues are the private 
sector´s responsibilities. 
Private sector is 
responsible for 
all stages of the 
project. 
Risk 
Risk is entirely (or 
almost entirely) 
assumed by public 
sector. 
Risk is shared between public 
and private sector. Private 
sector assumes several risks, 
(usually: design, construction, 
financing, operations and, in 
some cases, demand). 




Private sector is only 
responsible for 
construction costs of 
the asset. 
Private sector is responsible 
for the ‘whole life costing’ 
(capex and opex) of the project 
Private sector is 
responsible for 











and national debt. 
No impact on budget during 
the investment stage (PPPs are 
off-balance sheet). Only 
payments, during operational 
stage, are public expenditures. 
No public funds. 
Private sector 






the public budget 
(i.e., taxes or public 
debt) 
Investment is financed by 
private sector, equity and debt 






There is only a 
construction 
contract between 
government and a 
private firm. 
There is a concession contract, 
for a number of years (usually 
30 y or more), specifying the 
conditions of design, 
construction, financing, 
operation, payments and 
residual value/transfer. 
There is a selling 
contract of the 
asset/service to 




Asset is owned by 
public sector. 
Asset is public or reverts 










Table 3 –PPPs advantages and disadvantages from a government perspective 
 
This table discusses the advantages and disadvantages of PPPs from a public sector perspective  



































Impact on GDP 
and on unit costs 
Temptation to 
build assets with 
no economic or 
social rationality. 
Public funds 








Better use of 
public resources 
VfM is complex 
and difficult to 
measure; 
VfM is based 
mainly on risk 
transfer 
It is not clearly 








Risks allocated to 




Risk is complex 
process;  
Bias in PPPs’ 
favour; 










address key issues 




Lack of clear 
public policies 
and objectives; 
PPP planning is 
complex  

























Table 4 – Corporate finance versus project finance 
 
This table presents the main differences between corporate and project finance 
Issue Corporate Finance Project Finance 
Company portfolio 
Usually a large portfolio of business 
units and, in some cases, in several 
countries 
The Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) only 
owns and operates the project. 
Asset ownership 
Shareholder ultimately owns the 
assets 
Usually assets belong to governments 
(especially in PPPs); the SPV owns a 
concession contract. 
Duration No limit in time 
The concession contract period is 
often long but limited (20-30 years).  
Debt guarantees Debt is guaranteed by the assets 
‘Non-resource debt’. The only 
guarantee is the future cash-flows of 
the project. 
Debt priority 
 Bank debt is usually secured. If not, 
there is no debt bank prioritisation. 
There is Senior and Junior debt. Cash-
Flows first repay Senior, later Junior 
and finally equity return.   
Debt balance 
sheet 
Debt appears in company’s balance 
sheet. 
Debt is on the SPV balance sheet.  
 
Leverage 
Medium level (30%-40%) (Esty, 
2004) 
High level: 
(70%-90%), (Esty, 2004); (Blanc-Brude 
& Strange, 2007)  
(80%-90%), (Spackman, 2002);  
(80%-98%), (Sarmento, 2010) 
In some cases, close to 100%, (Ye & 
Tiong, 2003) 
Debt optimisation 
Debt level is related to total assets 
and equity. 
Adjust debt to the project cash-flows, 
optimising the level of leverage 
Interest rates on 
debt 
Level of interest rates is firm-
specific.  
Interest rates are usually low (spreads 
from 1%-2%), a little above the free-
risk rate. 
Business risk Significant variation, firm-specific  
Low level of risk for sponsors and 
lenders 
Dividend policy Decided by board of directors 
Dividend policy is fixed. Dividends are 
almost 100% of net income. No 
reinvestment outside the project is 
allowed by the SPV 
Transaction costs Low, due to strong competition 








Table 5 - The traffic bands in the Fertagus concession 
 
This table shows the predicted traffic bands in Fertagus’s initial contract and the conditions of 
the private company for each traffic scenario. 
Annual traffic Conditions to Fertagus 
Above the upper band Improvement in the service and a review of tariffs. 
Upper band Increasing costs to Fertagus 
Reference band According to the concession conditions 
Lower band Reducing costs to Fertagus 






Table 6 – Synthesis of the first five Lusoponte Financial Rebalance Agreements 
 
This table summarises the outcome of the first five renegotiations (1995 - 2000) 
Request fundamentals 
Value of the demand 
by Lusoponte 
Value of the pay by 
government 
Payment mechanism 
FRA 1 – 24/03/1995 
 No increase in tolls 
 August exemption 
 Increase in the 
project risk due to 
protests 
€ 90.4 M € 90.4 M Direct compensation 
FRA 2 – 23/09/1996 
 No increase in tools € 4.9 M € 4.9 M€ Direct compensation 
FRA 3 – 17/02/1997 
 Exemption in 
August of 1996 and 
1997 
€ 4.9 M € 4.9 M Direct compensation 
FRA 4 – 22/02/1999 
 No increase in tools 
 Exemption in 
August of 1998 
€ 63.2 M €4 .9 M Direct compensation 
FRA 5 – 03/03/2000 
 No increase in tools 
 Exemption in 
August of 1999 
17.9 M€ 17.9 M€ Direct compensation 







Table 7 – Dynamics of negotiation towards the global agreement 
This table presents the initial agreement’s conditions that were changed in the 2001 global 
agreement 
Conditions Initial agreement 2001 Global agreement 
Tools 
Two bridges with the same 
tool price 
Pricing difference between the 
two bridges 
Commercial policy Non-existent Frequent user discount 
Tax benefits Non-existent 
Changes in the recognition of 
revenues, reduction in corporate 
income tax 
Concession period Up to 2.25 million vehicles 2030 
Claw-back Non-existent Non-existent 
Source: own table, based on Court of Audits information 
 
Table 8 – Renegotiations 
This table presents the main features in both renegotiation case studies. 
Characteristics Fertagus Lusoponte 
Event (s) that lead to 
renegotiation 
 Demand below initial 
forecast 
 Government decisions to not 
increase tolls price or end 
august exemption in ‘25 
Abril’ bridge 
Renegotiation request by  Private  Public 
Nº renegotiations  1  7 




Changes in contract 
 Deleverage of Fertagus 
balance-sheet 
 Change in demand risk 
 Claw-back mechanism 
 From 1995 to 2000, public 
financial compensations 
 In 2001 (global agreement):  
 Change in toll prices 
 Increase in concession 
period 
 Financial compensation 
 No claw-back 
Did project risk change, and 
how? 
 Yes, reduce  Yes, reduce 
Did project profitability change, 
and how? 
 Yes, reduce  No 
Public sector financial support  € 80 M  € 500 M 
Renegotiation outcome 
 Concession remain open 
 Good performance and 
service quality 
 After 2010, concession 
became financial viable 
 Public sector has shared the 
gains above the base case, 
after renegotiation 
 Public funds support most of 
the investment 
 Additional benefits were 
totally captured by private 
sector 
 Doubts about the efficiency 
in this PPP 
 
